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1 Introduction
The experimental literature provides substantial evidence of the existence
of strong individual heterogeneity in strategic sophistication. Observed in-
dividual behavior departs drastically from the predictions derived under
the assumption of publicly-known unbounded cognitive capabilities (Nagel,
1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001;
Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002). This seems to reect di¤erences in the extent
to which individuals engage in mentalizing processes or "theory of mind",
that is, the activity of thinking about othersthoughts, emotions and inten-
tions (Baron-Cohen, 1991). Models of k-level thinking have been proposed in
order to account for these experimental results. These models acknowledge
that individuals have di¤erent cognitive levels and non-equilibrium beliefs
about the sophistication of others.1
But strategic sophistication is a complex concept to pin down. Depth of
strategic reasoning might depend on innate mentalizing or cognitive abilities,
beliefs about the sophistication of others, and on the incentives provided. An
individual may be sophisticated enough to choose the strategy corresponding
to the standard game theoretical prediction but that choice may fail to
acknowledge that the rest of the population might be incapable of that. It
would be questionable to label such choice as more sophisticated than one
that departs from the game theoretical prediction but takes correctly into
account the heterogeneity in strategic sophistication in the population. On
the other hand, a person may be reluctant to engage in further levels of
reasoning, which require extra mental e¤ort, when stakes are low or when
opponents are perceived as strategically unsophisticated. Responses in those
cases might not reect the mentalizing ability of individuals, but rather their
lack of motivation to engage in the process. In short, it should be natural
to expect observed strategic sophistication to depend on both beliefs about
the sophistication of others and on incentives.2
In this paper, we explore the heterogeneity and endogeneity of strategic
sophistication in the context of gender. Gender constitutes an obvious source
of observable heterogeneity across individuals. Hence, gender can bring up
1Level-k models of thinking were introduced by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson
(1994, 1995). Later, Camerer et al. (2004) proposed the cognitive hierarchy model.
Both models are anchored on the existence of non-strategic individuals, labelled level-0,
but di¤er on how individuals respond to the presence of less sophisticated ones. Level-k
models have been applied to a number of strategic interactions such as communication
and auctions. For a survey, see Crawford et al. (2013).
2See Choi (2012) and Alaoui and Penta (2016) for recent attempts to develop theoretical
models capable of accounting for the endogeneity of strategic sophistication.
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relevant questions in the analysis of strategic sophistication. In particular,
we investigate three questions that, to the best of our knowledge, have not
been addressed in the literature before.
The rst question is whether there exist gender di¤erences in depth of
strategic reasoning.3 In the psychology literature, superior mentalizing abil-
ity is typically ascribed to women (Baron-Cohen, 2002). But no study has
attempted to study whether this translates into higher levels of strategic
sophistication. The second question is whether such gender di¤erences (if
any) are mediated by beliefs about the relative strategic sophistication of
men and women. Gender stereotypes a¤ect daily behavior in a pervasive
manner. Perceptions about the gender-bias of tasks have been shown to
have an impact on gender di¤erences in performance (Guenther et al., 2010;
Shurchkov; 2012). Stereotypes might also inuence depth of strategic rea-
soning. We investigate whether gender salience and changes in the gender
composition of the group of players alter observed strategic sophistication.
Our third question relates to the endogeneity of depth of reasoning to in-
centives. We study whether males and females respond di¤erently to the
presence of monetary incentives. Alaoui and Penta (2016) show that higher
incentives induce deeper strategic reasoning. But higher stakes, or the ab-
sence of them, might also frame the interaction in a di¤erent light for men
and women, intensify or crowd out intrinsic motivation, and create gender
di¤erences in strategic behavior.
We explore these questions in the p-beauty contest/guessing game (Nagel,
1995). This game is well suited for our purposes for a number of reasons.
First, it is competitive. Players must predict the average response of oth-
ers in order to win a prize. Incentives are easy to adjust by changing its
monetary value. In addition, beliefs about the sophistication of others are
extremely important, as highlighted by models of k-level thinking. Finally,
the game involves a relatively complex calculation task: subjects must think
what might be the average response, and then multiply the result by the an-
nounced factor one or more times. This calculation may trigger gender
stereotypes related to the mathematical abilities of females.4 ;5
3This is denitely a thorny issue, more so since the Summers a¤air in 2005. We
believe that our understanding of strategic sophistication is better served by tackling such
question rather than by ignoring it altogether.
4Krendl et al. (2008) show that brain areas involved in calculation are less active in
females when this stereotype is activated. Some of these areas are also relevant for subjects
playing the beauty contest (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
5The existence of gender di¤erences in math performance is still a much debated issue.
To have an e¤ect on behavior, subjects only need to believe such stereotype to be true.
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We present ten years worth of experimental data from two studies run
in two countries and encompassing over a thousand individuals. Study 1
is a large classroom experiment. Students in six di¤erent cohorts played
the guessing game. In half of these cohorts, no monetary prize was given
to the winner(s), whereas a monetary prize was awarded in the other half.
We nd substantial gender di¤erences in the zero-stakes treatment. Female
subjects display lower strategic sophistication than males. However, no gen-
der di¤erences exist when a monetary prize is awarded because there is a
signicant shift down in females responses across treatments. Males do not
react signicantly to the presence of monetary incentives.
Study 2 is a laboratory experiment where we manipulate gender priming
and gender composition. This design allows us to compare the e¤ect on
strategic sophistication of gender priming and of changes in gender compo-
sition. Our ndings corroborate the result in Study 1, namely that females
display lower strategic sophistication than males when incentives are absent
and that no gender di¤erences exist when a monetary prize is at stake. Gen-
der di¤erences re-emerge in the opposite direction when we prime gender:
Females display higher strategic sophistication than males. Changes in gen-
der composition only a¤ect a subset of males; they decrease their responses
when playing in mixed gender groups compared to single gender groups.
We explore the reasons behind these results by analyzing the responses
to a questionnaire administered to participants in Study 2 at the end of
each session and to non-participants of similar characteristics. We nd that
beliefs about the relative advantage of males and females have a signicant
e¤ect on behavior. Males who believe females are better in the game dis-
play lower strategic sophistication than those who believe the opposite. This
di¤erence is in line with the concept of stereotype threat (Steele, 1997) by
which members of negatively stereotyped groups perform worse in fear of
conrming the stereotype. On the other hand, gender priming has the e¤ect
of increasing strategic sophistication among women who believe females are
better in the game. Our gender manipulation seems to activate this per-
ception and boost these womens depth of strategic reasoning. We conclude
that the overall positive e¤ect of gender priming on the sophistication of
women and of mixed gender groups on the sophistication of men is due to
females perceiving themselves and being perceived as superior in the game.
The rests of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Sections 3 and 4 present the results of Study 1 and 2 respectively.
We analyze the responses to questionnaires in Section 5. Section 6 performs
a robustness check with an alternative measure of strategic sophistication.
In Section 7 we conclude and discuss further the relevance of our results.
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2 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst experimental study analyzing
the existence of gender di¤erences in depth of reasoning, beliefs and sensi-
tivity to incentives in games. The reason behind this might be a genuine
lack of di¤erences, but also a conscious choice of researchers due either to
ideological reasons or to the potential controversy of the topic. Very few ex-
perimental studies report evidence of gender di¤erences in observed strategic
sophistication as a by-product of their design either. Camerer et al. (2004)
report in their Table 2 results for a beauty contest in same gender groups,
but they only show summary statistics. Burnham et al. (2009) nd no gen-
der di¤erences in choices in the beauty contest. This is consistent with the
results we obtain when gender is not primed and monetary incentives are
given. Östling et al. (2011) and Arad and Rubinstein (2012)6 report that
females display slightly lower strategic sophistication in the Lowest Unique
Positive Integer (LUPI) game and in the Colonel Blotto games respectively.
Let us reiterate that the main goal of these studies was not to investigate
the existence of gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication.
Several studies have explored the existence of other types of individual
di¤erences in the beauty contest. Burnham et al. (2009) and Gill and Prowse
(2015) show that there is a signicant correlation between higher cognitive
ability and lower entries. Behavior in the beauty contest is similar across
subject pools, although some di¤erences exist; portfolio managers and game
theorists display higher strategic sophistication (Bosch-Domenech, et al.,
2002; Camerer et al., 2004). Kovalchik et al. (2005) nd that older adults
play similarly to young adults and Bühren and Bjorn (2010) nd that chess
grandmasters do not play di¤erently than lay people.
A number of studies have found that depth of strategic reasoning re-
sponds strongly to the perceived sophistication of opponents. Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2009) nd that when students play the centipede game
against professional chess players they engage in more rounds of backward
induction.7 Agranov et al. (2012) nd that undergraduate students dis-
play higher strategic sophistication when playing the guessing game against
graduate students than against computers. Georganas et al. (2015) nd a
similar result in the undercutting game.
We are aware of only one experimental study relating strategic sophis-
tication to incentives. Alaoui and Penta (2015) nd that subjects engage
6Personal communication with the authors.
7This is not contemplated by models of k-level thinking since agents in these models
do not factor the presence of individuals more sophisticated than them.
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in more rounds of reasoning when the prize from outguessing the opponent
increases.8 However, these authors do not explore gender di¤erences in the
response to higher stakes. Fryer et al. (2008) nd that the performance
of males in a GRE-style mathematical test increases relative to the perfor-
mance of females when a payment per correct answer is introduced. Azmat
et al. (2015) nd that the gender performance-gap in exams in favor of
female high school students vanishes as stakes increase. This is in contrast
with what we nd in our two studies, but this might be due to the strategic
nature of our experiment. In line with our ndings, Frick (2011) employs
data from professional distance running competitions and nds that di¤er-
ences in the competitiveness between female and male races are signicantly
smaller in races where higher prizes or more prestige are at stake. Similarly,
Petrie and Segal (2015) observe that the gender gap in tournament entry
vanishes when prizes become su¢ ciently large.
By using a competitive game, in which the player who best guesses the
average response wins, our paper also relates to the literature in Economics
which studies gender di¤erences in competitive performance. Gneezy et al.
(2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) have shown that females underper-
form in competitive environments. Guenther et al. (2010) nd that compet-
itive performance depends on the perceived bias of the task; females perform
better than males when the task is perceived as female-biased. Along simi-
lar lines, Shurchkov (2012) nd that females overtake men in competitions
involving a verbal task and low-time pressure. Regarding the e¤ect of gen-
der priming, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2016) show that omitting information
about the gender of the opponent helps to mitigate the underperformance
of women in competition. In contrast, we nd that gender priming induces
females to display higher strategic sophistication and to outperform males.
3 Study 1: Beauty in the classroom
Participants in this study were six cohorts of undergraduate students tak-
ing an Intermediate Microeconomics course at the University of Edinburgh
between 2005 and 2010. As part of the course, students had to ll an on-
line problem set containing several game-theoretic questions implemented
via the website Games and Behavior developed by Ariel Rubinstein and
8Arad and Rubinstein (2012) run a treatment where they manipulate payo¤s so that
further levels of reasoning have no monetary cost. They nd that nevertheless subjects
very rarely perform more than three rounds of reasoning.
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Eli Zvuluny9. Cohorts were large, ranging between 116 and 170 students.
Completing the problem set was compulsory and liable to a small mark
penalty. Response rates were 91.83% on average. Students had no previous
instructions in game theory before answering the questions and they had a
diverse background both by nationality and by major of study.10 In total,
792 students took part; 480 of them were male and 312 were female.11
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Figure 1:Histogram of responses in Study 1.
One of the questions in the problem set was a beauty contest. Students
had to guess two-thirds of the average of all responses of students in the
class.12 Figure 1 contains the histogram of responses for the entire sample.
The graph shows the typical pattern of responses in experimental beauty
contests (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002): A 3% or participants responded
zero, the Nash equilibrium prediction. The spikes of frequency at 50, 33 and
22, according to the theory of k-level thinking, correspond to individuals
with sophistication of level 0, 1 and 2 respectively.
9Available at http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/.
10Under the Scottish university system, students have the option of taking courses
outside their major during their rst two years.
11When retrieving the data from the website, we were provided rst with the list of
participantsnames but without their responses in order to ensure anonimity. We then
assigned gender to these names and returned the list. We then received the data associ-
ating responses to the gender of the responder.
12The exact phrasing was: "Each of you (the students in this course) have to choose an
integer between 0 and 100 in order to guess 2/3 of the average of the responses given by
all students in the course. Each student who guesses 2/3 of the average of all responses
rounded up to the nearest integer, will receive a prize to be announced by your teacher
(or alternatively will have the satisfaction of being right!)."
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However, this histogram masks important heterogeneity. We ran two
di¤erent treatments with three cohorts each: In the 2007, 2008 and 2010
cohorts (n=401), a prize of £ 10 (about 12 euros) was given to the student
who made the best guess. If there were more than one winner in the class,
the prize was divided among them. We call this the Prize treatment. The
No prize treatment corresponds to the other three cohorts (n=391) in which
no money was awarded to the winner. The instructor did not mention in
class that the name of the winner(s) was to be announced publicly. So for
the No prize treatment, such non-monetary reward was not made explicit.13
Table 1 shows the aggregate results for the two treatments in Study 1,
and compares them with the aggregate results of other experimental beauty
contests. The studies in italics correspond to subject pools composed by
non-students.14 The rst clear thing to observe is that the mean and me-
dian responses for the Prize treatment are in line with those in previous
experiments. We can then safely conclude that despite being implemented
online, this treatment is comparable to other experiments.
Mean Median Std dev Group size
Study 1 - Prize 36.1 33 23 110-170
Study 1 - No prize 39.2 37 23.3 103-156
Nagel (1995) 37.2 33 20 14-16
Ho et al. (1998) 38.9 NA 24.7 7
Camerer (2003) 32.5 NA 18.6 20-32
Kovalchik et al. (2005) 37 NA 17.5 33
Kocher and Sutter (2005) 34.9 32 NA 17
Buhren and Bjorn (2010) 32.1 29.6 22.2 6,112
Agranov et al. (2012) 36.4 33 21 8
Table 1: Aggregate results in Study 1 and in other experimental beauty contests.
The second observation is that the No prize treatment shows the highest
average and median responses of all studies reported in Table 1. It is natural
to expect that the lack of monetary prizes should induce students to think
less about the game. From now on, and as it is customary in the litera-
ture, we will associate lower responses to deeper strategic reasoning. Under
this assumption, students in the No prize treatment should respond higher
13This does not rule out that students could seek prestige or status among their closer
peers by winning.
14Camerer (2003) uses CEOs; Kovalchik et al. (2005) 80 year olds; Buhren and Bjorn
(2010) employs chess players, from amateurs to Grand masters.
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numbers than in the Prize treatment. The data supports this prediction.
The distribution of responses under Prize di¤ers from the distribution under
No prize (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:041; Median test, p = 0:047). If lower re-
sponses are associated to higher strategic e¤ort, we should also observe the
accumulated distribution of responses for the No prize treatment to rst
order stochastically dominate the accumulated distribution of responses for
the Prize treatment. Figure 2 suggests this is the case and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of rst stochastic dominance corroborates this (p = 0:032).15
This evidence supports that higher incentives induced students to engage in
deeper strategic reasoning.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of responses by treatment.
A closer look at the data shows however that male and female students
responded very di¤erently to the presence of a monetary prize. Table 2
shows the aggregate results by gender in the two treatments. The striking
result there is that average and median responses for females in the No prize
treatment are much higher than any other. Another interesting observation
is that malesresponses do not di¤er much across the two treatments.
15This test is based on the signicance of the largest positive di¤erence between two
CDFs. The outcome of the test is that distribution f rst order stochastically dominates
g if the largest positive di¤erence of f over g is signicant but not the one of g over f: We
report the p-value of the largest di¤erence in the favor of the dominating distribution.
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Mean Median Std dev Obs.
Male, No prize 37.6 35 23.9 243
Female, No prize 41.9 42 23.3 148
Male, Prize 35.7 33 22.7 237
Female, Prize 36.4 34 23.5 164
Table 2: Aggregate results by gender and treatment.
Result 1 The distribution of responses of females di¤ers between Prize
and No prize treatments (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:026; Median test,
p = 0:054), and di¤ers between males and females in the No prize
treatment (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:049; Median test, p = 0:029).
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Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender and treatment.
Figure 3 breaks down the cumulative distributions of responses by gender
across treatments (upper panels) and by treatments across genders (lower
panels). The cumulative distributions of responses in the No prize treat-
ment is depicted with dashed lines. We use the stereotypical colours blue
and pink for males and females respectively. The graphs show clearly that
the distribution of female responses under No prize rst order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of female responses in the Prize treatment
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0:031); whereas dominance for males is unclear.
In addition to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we will also employ through-
out the paper the test of stochastic dominance introduced by Davidson and
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Duclos (2000).16 This tests allows us to associate stochastic dominance to a
particular range of responses and, hence, to a certain degree of strategic so-
phistication. The Davidson-Duclos test yields that the distribution of female
responses under the No prize treatment rst order stochastically dominates
the distribution under the Prize treatment. In addition, the distribution
of male responses is not statistically di¤erent across the two treatments.
Although a higher proportion of males responded numbers between 30 and
50 compared to the No prize treatment, the di¤erence is too small to be
signicant (see Table A1 in Appendix A).
The lower left panel shows the cumulative distributions of male and fe-
male responses under the No prize treatment. The Davidson-Duclos test
concludes that the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of male responses (see third column of Table A1
in Appendix A). Dominance comes from responses between 0 and 18 and
between 35 and 54. According to the k-level theory, these are the responses
roughly corresponding to very sophisticated (level-3 and higher) and rela-
tively unsophisticated subjects (level-0 and 1) respectively. More females
seem to populate the medium sophistication range of responses (between 19
and 34) and the quite unsophisticated range (55 and above), although no
gender di¤erences exist in the proportion of completely irrational responses
(68 and above).
The lower right panel shows a very di¤erent picture: when a monetary
prize is given, gender di¤erences become insignicant (see fourth column
of Table A1 in Appendix A). Females show deeper levels of reasoning, as
suggested by their lower responses, when a monetary prize is at stake. The
extent of this reaction is such that gender di¤erences vanished when a mone-
tary prize was at stake. This might explain why Burnham et al. (2009) nd
no gender di¤erences in entries in the beauty contest. On the other hand,
males do not respond signicantly to monetary incentives. This would sug-
gest that the conclusion of Camerer and Hogarth (1999) whereby monetary
incentives have a small e¤ect in experimental games might not necessarily
apply to female populations. If nancial incentives constitute a cue indicat-
ing that the beauty contest is a competitive interaction, it is to be expected
that females react to this contextual information more strongly than men
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
16This test compares distributions at pre-determined points. A distribution is said to
rst stochastically dominate another if for all comparison points for which di¤erences
between the two distributions are statistically signicant the sign of these di¤erences is
identical. We compared distributions at all points between 0 and 100. In Appendix A, we
report comparisons at a number of point responses.
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But the fact that males do not react to the presence of monetary prize
also suggests that males may consider that a non-monetary prize is at stake
in the No prize treatment. This non-monetary prize could be the utility of
winning. In contests, Sheremeta (2010) nds that about a third of subjects
are willing to spend a positive amount of money in order to win a zero value
prize. This is consistent with males in the No prize treatment displaying
similar depth of strategic reasoning to females in the Prize treatment. But
since economic incentives did not a¤ect their strategic e¤ort, it might be the
case that males either regarded the prize as of relatively low value or that
the monetary incentive crowded out any psychological reward.
4 Study 2: Beauty in the lab
The aim of our second experimental study was to check whether strategic so-
phistication might be a¤ected by gender priming and changes in the gender
composition of the set of opponents. This study was conducted with four
di¤erent cohorts of undergraduate students at the University of Barcelona
between 2012 and 2015. We made sure that subjects were recruited without
they noticing that the experiment related to gender.17 A total of 240 sub-
jects participated in the study. This sample was more homogeneous than
the sample in Study 1. Virtually all subjects were Spanish and all of them
majored in the School of Economics and Business.
All participants played in gender-balanced groups of 24 subjects except in
one of the treatments, as specied below. Subjects could see each other but
were seated at a considerable distance so they could not communicate. This
was intended, because we wanted subjects to see the gender composition
of the group. The experiment was implemented with pen and paper, no
feedback was provided during the session, only at the end. Experimenters
answered privately any questions subjects had. The sessions lasted between
40 and 50 minutes. There were always two instructors in each room. Their
gender matched the gender composition of participants in the room.
Each session was divided in two phases. The rst phase was common to
all sessions and treatments. In this phase, there were no monetary incentives
and gender was never referred to or made salient. During this phase, subjects
were asked to guess a fraction p of the average response in their room. They
played nine rounds of this guessing game with di¤erent values of p in each
round. The values were p =
 
1; 23 ;
11
10 ;
1
3 ;
3
2 ;
1
5 ;
6
5 ;
1
2 ;
4
3

. Instructions were
17For showing up, subjects received three euros
.
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provided through white paper booklets where participants also had to record
their answers. The experimenters read the instructions aloud to facilitate
comprehension. Subjects did not write neither their name nor their gender
in these booklets. Each participant was assigned a number that served as
their unique identier. The purpose of this rst phase was twofold: rst to
help subjects to familiarize with the beauty contest and second, to replicate
the results from Study 1 on the existence of gender di¤erences in behavior
in the absence of incentives.
In the second phase we introduced incentives and administered two
treatments, the Priming treatment (n=144) and the No priming treatment
(n=96). In the second phase of the sessions pertaining to the No priming
treatment, participants had to guess two-thirds of the average response in
their room. The winner got a prize of 40 euros (around £ 32); the prize was
divided if there was more than one winner. Participants had to provide their
answer in a white paper sheet.
In the second phase of the sessions pertaining to the Priming treatment
subjects played two independent rounds where they had to guess two-thirds
of the average response in their room. The di¤erence between the two rounds
was the gender composition of the group, single gender (SG) or mixed (bal-
anced) gender (MG). These sessions were run in two rooms located in two
di¤erent corridors. Hence, at the beginning of the second phase, there were
two gender-balanced groups of 24 participants in each room. We then si-
multaneously moved either all the male or female students in each room
from one room to the other using di¤erent corridors so the two groups could
not see each other. We combined these movements of participants in such a
way that di¤erent sessions alternated the order of the SG and MG rounds.
When moving from one room to the other, participants were guided by an
instructor of their same gender who made all e¤orts to prevent any commu-
nication among them. All participants changed room at some point of the
session. To help the reader, we provide a graphical representation of these
movements in Figure A1 of Appendix A.
The purpose of this manipulation was to prime gender. Gender was
also made salient by distributing pink booklets to female subjects and blue
booklets to male subjects. In addition, the gender of the pair of instruc-
tors present in each room matched the gender composition of the subjects
in it. This means that in the MG round there was one female and one
male instructor in each room, and in the SG round, the gender of the two
instructors in the room coincided with the gender of the group.
Payo¤s in the Priming treatment were determined by selecting randomly
one of the two rounds of the second phase. Consequently, there were two
14
prizes of 40 euros each, one per room. At the end of the session, participants
lled up a short questionnaire aimed to elicit their views about the behavior
of males and females in the game and their relative strategic sophistication.
We analyze the responses to this questionnaire in Section 5.
4.1 Results within rounds
4.1.1 First phase: no incentives, no gender priming
Table 3 depicts the aggregate results for the round of the rst phase with
p = 23 . Recall that in that phase, there were no incentives and no gender
priming. The distribution of male responses has a lower mean and median
than the distribution of female entries.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 28.9 25 17.7
Females 32.1 30 20.5
Table 3: Aggregate results by gender in the No incentives round.
In addition, the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of male responses. The Davidson-Duclos test
reports that this gender di¤erence emerges in the interval of responses from
42 to 50 (see rst column of Table A2 in Appendix A), which corresponds
to a low level of strategic sophistication. Figure 4 illustrates this result.
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Figure 4: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender in the rst
phase with p=2/3.
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This dominance result holds for all rounds of the rst phase. The distri-
bution of females responses rst order stochastically dominates the one of
males in all rounds with p < 1 and the reverse holds in all rounds with p > 1
(see Figure A2 in Appendix A). Gender di¤erences remain very strong even
in the last round of this rst phase, the one with p = 43 ; and in the round
with p = 12 ; the last round subjects played with p < 1: In that round, again,
the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically dominates the
one for males (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0:049). Hence any feedback-free
learning (Weber, 2003) that might take place across the phase does not seem
to help to reduce gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication.
To highlight further these strong gender di¤erences, we classify subjects
according to their sophistication across the phase: For each p 6= 1, we as-
sign the level k = f1; 2; 3;1g to individual response xi when k minimizes
d =
 
xi   50pk
2
. We follow Coricelli and Nagel (2009) and classify a re-
sponse as a low level response if k = 1 (high level otherwise). A subject is
considered to be of low (high) sophistication if at least ve out of her/his
eight responses are of low (high) level. The rest of subjects are consid-
ered random and discarded from the analysis. This classication reects
how close an individual plays with respect to the equilibrium prediction. It
also indirectly incorporates beliefs about the sophistication of the opponent:
Coricelli and Nagel (2009) show through fMRI that subjects classied as
highly sophisticated display a more intense activation in areas of the brain
associated with theory of mind than low sophisticated subjects.
As Table 4 shows, 80.7 % of the classied individuals in the sample are
low sophisticated; from these, 58.9% are female. The percentages of High
and Low sophistication subjects out of the whole pool (19.2% and 80.7%
respectively) are very similar to the ones obtained in previous studies.18
However, these gures mask important gender di¤erences. The small frac-
tion of females who exhibit high strategic sophistication (9.2%) stands out.
It is signicantly di¤erent from the proportion of highly sophisticated males
(proportions test, p < 0:001).
Low High Total
Males 69 30 99
Females 99 10 109
Total 168 40 208
Table 4: Sophistication by gender (rst phase).
18Coricelli and Nagel (2009) obtain 35% and 50% respectively (n=20). Brañas-Garza,
Garc¬a-Muñoz and Hernan (2012) obtain 13% and 78% (n=191).
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All this evidence reinforces the result we obtained in Study 1: When
nancial incentives are absent, females display lower levels of strategic so-
phistication than males.
4.1.2 Second phase: incentives and no gender priming
Now we move to the second phase of the experimental session, where we
introduced incentives. Recall that in this phase we applied two treatments:
a control treatment (No priming treatment) and another treatment in which
we made gender salient (Priming treatment).
In the control treatment, the gender composition of the group was always
balanced. Table 5 shows that the distribution of responses of females has a
larger mean and median than the one of males.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 23.2 17 18.8
Females 29.2 24.5 21.3
Table 5: Aggregate results by gender in the No priming treatment.
Males display higher strategic sophistication than females in the No
priming treatment. However, the distributions of males and females re-
sponses in this treatment are not statistically di¤erent (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0:128; Median test, p = 0:153). Furthermore, both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and the Davidson-Duclos tests cannot rank these distributions in
terms of rst order stochastic dominance (see second column of Table A2 in
Appendix A). We again corroborate the results obtained in Study 1: Gender
di¤erences in strategic sophistication disappear when monetary incentives
are present.
4.1.3 Gender priming
As mentioned above, we primed gender by manipulating the gender com-
position of the group and the colour of the instruction booklets. Thus, we
are able to analyse gender di¤erences in depth of reasoning when gender is
salient and the gender composition of the group changes.
The MG round Recall, that in the MG round of the Priming treatment,
half of the participants in each room were male and half were female. The
only di¤erence between the second phase of the No priming treatment and
the MG round is that gender was made salient in the latter. In contrast
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with previous results, Table 6 shows that the distribution of responses of
females in the MG round has a lower mean and median than those of males.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 27.4 25 18.3
Females 21.4 19 17.7
Table 6: Aggregate results by gender in the Priming MG round.
Females display higher strategic sophistication than males in this round.
The comparison of the distributions of responses across genders in the MG
round shows indeed that they are statistically di¤erent (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0:021; Median test, p = 0:009). Furthermore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(p = 0:011) and the Davidson-Duclos (see third column of Table A2 in
Appendix A) dominance tests provide a clear ordering between them.
Result 2.1 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses in the MG round of
the Priming treatment.
Figure 5 illustrates this result. The Davidson-Duclos dominance test
establishes that there is a higher number of females than males who choose
responses in the interval between 12 and 24. This suggests that more females
display relatively higher levels of sophistication than males.
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Figure 5: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender in the MG round.
The SG round In this round of the Priming treatment, participants
played against opponents of their same gender. Table 7 shows the mean and
median responses for males and females. Again, the average and median
male response are higher than the average and median female response.
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Mean Median Std dev
Males 29.9 26 20.9
Females 20.7 17 14.9
Table 7: Aggregate results by gender in the Priming SG round.
The distributions of responses across genders are statistically di¤erent
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:009; Median test, p = 0:017) and the dominance
result is even stronger than in the MG round, as Figure 6 illustrates. The
interval of signicant dominance according to the Davidson-Duclos tests
ranges from 14 to 27 and from 44 to 74 (see fourth column of Table A2 in
Appendix A).
Result 2.2 The distribution of male responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of female responses in the SG round.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender in the SG round.
To summarize, the main ndings of the analysis by round are: 1) We
conrm that males show higher levels of sophistication than females in the
absence of incentives. 2) We conrm that gender di¤erences disappear when
there are monetary incentives. And 3), when gender is primed, females
display higher levels of strategic sophistication than males.
4.2 Results across rounds
4.2.1 Priming versus No priming
Let us now exploit our design in order to compare individual responses, rst
across the gender-balanced rounds of the Priming and No priming treat-
ments, and then across the MG and SG rounds of the Priming treatment.
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We expect gender priming to make beliefs about the relative strategic
sophistication of males and females salient. If this is the case, responses
across the two treatments should change. But how? If there exists the
stereotype that a gender is inferior to the other in the game, members of
that gender may feel stereotype threat (Steele, 1997), and become anxious
about their performance. This might be the case for females if they perceive
that the mathematical calculation involved in the guessing game favors males
(Quinn and Spencer, 2001), or for males if they believe women are superior
in mentalizing or in strategic interactions in general. Stereotype threat
has been consistently associated with higher emotional loads and cognitive
impairment (e.g. Croizet et al., 2004; Krendl et al., 2008; Schmader and
Johns, 2003). Hence, we would expect the threatened group to display lower
levels of sophistication, and choose higher entries, in the Priming treatment
than in the No priming treatment. Individuals can also enjoy stereotype lift
(Walton and Cohen, 2003) when they belong to the group they believe is
superior in the task. If there is the stereotype that a gender is superior to
the other, we would expect members of that group to display higher levels of
sophistication, and thus lower entries, in the Priming treatment compared
to the No priming one.
Table 8 below compares responses by gender and across the gender-
balanced rounds of the Priming and the No priming treatments. We observe
that females change their behavior considerably when gender is made salient.
Their mean and median responses are much lower in the Priming treatment.
Men change their answers to a lesser extent and in the opposite direction.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, Priming MG 27.4 25 18.3
Female, Priming MG 21.4 19 17.7
Male, No priming 23.2 17 18.8
Female, No priming 29.2 24.5 21.3
Table 8: Aggregate results by gender and across gender-balanced rounds.
The distributions of responses in the two treatments di¤er only for fe-
males (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:034; Median test, p = 0:052). Di¤erences in
the distribution of males responses across treatments are weaker (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:138; Median test, p = 0:062). But the Davidson-Duclos test
can rank these distributions in terms of rst stochastic dominance.
Result 3 The distributions of female responses under No priming rst or-
der stochastically dominates the one under Priming. The opposite
holds for malesresponses.
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This dominance test (see table A3 in Appendix A) establishes that under
Priming fewer males display high levels of sophistication (entries between
10 and 18) whereas fewer females display low and medium levels of sophis-
tication (entries between 20 and 24 and between 32 and 42). Figure 7 cor-
roborates this. In summary, females respond strongly to gender priming by
increasing their level of sophistication whereas males react to a lesser extent
and display slightly lower strategic sophistication when gender is salient.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender and treatment in the
gender-balanced rounds.
Result 3 suggests that strategic interactions might be a context where
females might perceive themselves and be perceived to be superior. Common
wisdom is that women are better at imagining what others think and feel.
This is supported by studies reporting female superiority in empathy and
mentalizing ability (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Krach et al., 2009). Our gender
priming seems to activate this stereotype, boosting womens sophistication
and reducing maless depth of strategic reasoning. We investigate this idea
in Section 5 when analyzing subjects beliefs about the relative strategic
sophistication of men and women.
4.2.2 MG versus SG
Let us now compare the SG and the MG rounds. Recall that in the second
phase of the Priming treatment we manipulated the gender composition of
the groups of participants. The purpose of this manipulation was to explore
the role of beliefs about the strategic sophistication of the opponents. In
line with the ndings in Agranov et al. (2012), we conjecture that if an
individual believes that a change in the gender composition shifts up (down)
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the distribution of levels of sophistication in the group, he/she will exert
more (less) e¤ort and his/her entry will decrease (increase).
Table 9 shows that the average and median responses of both sexes do
not signicantly di¤er across the SG and the MG rounds and that the gender
di¤erences observed in the MG round persist in the SG round.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, SG 29.9 26 20.9
Female, SG 20.7 17 14.9
Male, MG 27.4 25 18.3
Female, MG 21.4 19 17.7
Table 9: Aggregate results by gender across the SG and MG rounds.
The distributions of males responses in the SG and MG rounds are
not statistically di¤erent (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:276; Sign-test, p =
0:427). The same result applies to femalesresponses (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:959; Sign-test p = 1:000).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
R
es
po
ns
e 
M
G
 ro
un
d
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Response SG round
Figure 8: Malesresponses in the MG and SG rounds.
A more detailed picture emerges from Figure 8, the scatterplot of males
responses in both rounds. Dispersion from the 45 degree line increases as
responses are higher, and is denser below the line. This suggests that a
larger number of male subjects, especially those with higher entries in the
SG round, decrease their response in the MG round than in the other way
around. Statistical tests conrm this. Male participants who in the SG
round respond above the median decrease their entries in the MG round
(one tailed Sign-test, p = 0:040). There is no signicant change for males
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who choose entries below the median. This reduction of responses in the MG
round is consistent with males increasing their depth of reasoning compared
to the SG round because they perceive women to be superior in the game.
Alternatively, it might be that these males expect level-0 female players
to randomize on lower numbers than their male counterparts. In the next
section, we explore these two hypotheses by analyzing the responses to the
questionnaire administered at the end of the session.
Before that, let us summarize the results of the analysis across rounds:
1) Females react strongly to gender priming by becoming more sophisticated
whereas males react to a lesser extent and in the opposite direction. And 2)
males with higher responses in the SG round display higher sophistication
in the MG round.
5 Beliefs and stereotypes
In this section, we explore responses to the questionnaire we administered
to participants in our Study 2. Participants answered these questions at
the end of the session, before any feedback was provided. The aim of this
questionnaire was twofold. First, to investigate whether priming was e¤ec-
tive in activating gender stereotypes. Second, given that depth of strategic
reasoning depends on the perceived sophistication of others (Georganas et
al., 2015; Agranov et al., 2012), to explore whether beliefs about the relative
strategic sophistication of men and women inuence behavior.
We focus on the responses to two questions. The rst question is "When
p = 23 , which sex responds higher numbers?" (Q1) and the second is "Which
sex is better at this game?" (Q2). These two questions capture di¤erent
factors which might be important to understand subjectsbehavior. Q1 is
designed to obtain information on beliefs about the behavior of others and
Q2 is designed to elicit perceptions about the relative sophistication of males
and females. Although we have assumed in our analysis, that lower entries
are associated with higher strategic sophistication, this might not be true in
the mind of subjects. In addition, note that this association is based on the
assumption, customary in the literature, that level-0 behavior is a uniform
distribution on the set of strategies. But participants engaging in deeper
strategic reasoning might have stereotypes on the random behavior of males
and females which depart from that assumption.19
19A fraction of males responding to Q1 said that females tend to pick lower numbers
such as birthdays or lucky numbers. A similar fraction of females responded that males
tend to pick higher numbers because they like "speeding" and "big things in general."
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Answers were free-text, so we coded them in four options, "Males", "Fe-
males", "No di¤erence" and "Dont know". Responses display a medium to
strong correlation across questions (Contingency coe¢ cient, 0:443; Cramérs
V, 0:349): This implies that participants seemed to understand the basics of
the game and associated a better performance with lower responses.
Answers to Q1 were not incentivised. Whilst this might reduce their
validity, we show below that answers to that question have signicant ex-
planatory power. Admittedly, responses to both questions could be a¤ected
by the experiment itself. In order to have a cleaner source of informa-
tion, we also ran this questionnaire on a comparable population of students
from the University of Barcelona (n=134) and who had not been exposed
to the beauty contest game before. This allows us to compare responses
across three populations, subjects who participated in the Priming treat-
ment, those who participated in the No priming treatment, and respondents
who did not participate in the experiment.
5.1 Was priming e¤ective?
We saw in previous sections that priming had an e¤ect on entries in the
beauty contest, especially for females. Women in the Priming treatment
displayed higher strategic sophistication than their counterparts in the No
priming treatment. We observed the opposite e¤ect, albeit weaker, for
males. If priming was indeed e¤ective in raising gender salience and stereo-
types we should expect it to have an e¤ect on responses to our questionnaire.
Figure 9: Responses by gender to Q1 and Q2 (for females) by sample.
The left panel of Figure 9 shows the histogram of responses to Q1 by sub-
sample. The distribution of responses of participants who played in the No
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priming treatment and those outside our subject pool are not signicantly
di¤erent. Responses are quite evenly distributed across the three possible
answers. However, participants in the Priming treatment are more inclined
to believe that the opposite sex tends to respond higher numbers. The dif-
ference with respect to the rest of answers to this question is statistically
signicant (chi-squared; p = 0:0202). Our gender priming thus induced par-
ticipants to believe that there were gender di¤erences in entries in the game.
The right panel of Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of priming on responses to Q2
of female participants only. Female subjects in the No priming treatment
tended to believe that either males are better at the game or that there are no
gender di¤erences, whereas female subjects in the Priming treatment tend
to believe the opposite. The di¤erence is weakly signicant (chi-squared;
p = 0:099). This pattern is in line with our previous result showing that fe-
males display higher strategic sophistication when gender is salient. Gender
priming had no signicant e¤ect on malesresponses to Q2.
5.2 Gender bias
The next question is whether answers to the questionnaire can help explain
observed behavior. The rst issue we tackle relates to the association be-
tween behavior and beliefs about which gender has a relative advantage in
the guessing game. Our aim is to study whether gender stereotypes, ex-
pressed in responses to Q2, might be related to strategic sophistication.
As the next result shows, this relationship is straightforward for males.
Result 4.1 The distribution of responses in the incentivised gender-balanced
rounds of males who believe that males are better is di¤erent from
the distribution of males who believe that females are better (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:044).
The median response in the incentivised gender-balanced rounds for the
pooled sample of males who believe that females are better at the game is
25. It is 17 for males who believe that males are better at the game. The
perceived gender-bias in the beauty contest is thus associated with depth of
strategic reasoning in male subjects. Males subjects who believe that their
own gender has a relative advantage in the game, choose lower entries. Of
course, we cannot establish a casual relationship between perceptions and
behavior. It might be that males who respond lower numbers conclude that
their gender is better in the game (although there was no feedback until the
very end of the session). We come back to this point below when looking at
beliefs and gender composition.
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Surprisingly, the data does not provide evidence on the existence of the
analogous association in females. Their behavior in the incentivised gender-
balanced rounds is not related to their responses to Q2. However, a more
careful exploration shows that priming has a decisive e¤ect.
Result 4.2 Take the subset of females who believe that females are better
in the game. The distribution of responses of participants in the No
priming treatment rst order stochastically dominates the one of par-
ticipants in the Priming treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0:048).
This o¤ers an explanation for Result 3. The belief of women on their own
superiority in the game has an e¤ect on their behavior only when gender is
made salient. The di¤erence in median responses is striking: 40 for these
women in the No priming treatment and 17 in the Priming treatment. It
is important to note that in this case we can pin down the causality from
perceptions to behavior. It cannot be the case that behavior a¤ected their
responses to Q2 because these are all women who believe that females are
better in the game. So we can conclude that the combination of gender
salience and the belief that women are better in the game boosted the depth
of reasoning of these participants.
Interestingly, gender priming has no signicant e¤ect on females who
answer that males are better in the game or that no gender di¤erences exist.
This might be due to the absence of a negative stereotype against women in
the game. In our out sample survey, we asked an additional question (Q3):
"Which gender obtains better results in strategic interactions?" A 42.5%
of all respondents (57.5% for females) answered that females obtain better
results, and 34.3% answered that no di¤erence exists. This might explain
why gender priming has a neutral to positive e¤ect on our female subjects.
5.3 Gender composition
Let us now explore whether responses to the questionnaire can help us ex-
plain the changes we observed between the MG and the SG rounds of the
Priming treatment. First we want to establish that, despite not being in-
centivised, responses to Q1 can help to explain di¤erences in behavior across
these rounds.
Result 4.3 The median responses of subjects who believe their same (the
other) gender respond higher numbers is higher (lower) in the SG
round than in the MG round (Sign-test p = 0:014 and p = 0:020
respectively).
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Now we can return to the question we left open at the end of Section 4.
We had observed that males with higher responses in the SG round reduced
their entries in the MG round. We mentioned that this was consistent with
the perception that females are better in the game. We also mentioned that
these males might have picked lower numbers in the MG round because they
expected level-0 females to choose lower numbers than level-0 males. The
analysis of Q1 and Q2 can shed light on this. Under the rst hypothesis,
males who changed behavior should be those who believe that females are
better at the game. According to the second hypothesis, these males should
answer to Q1 that men tend to pick higher numbers.
Males who believe that men respond higher numbers than females change
their behavior between the SG and the MG rounds (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:050). This would lend support to the second hypothesis. However, we
nd no signicant opposite e¤ect for male subjects who believe that females
respond higher numbers. This begs the question of why changes in the gen-
der composition a¤ect only males who believe their own gender responds
higher numbers. On the other hand, notice that Result 4.1 extends to the
SG round: Males who answer that females are better at the game respond
higher numbers in the SG round than those who believe the opposite (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:024). Since males with higher responses in the SG round are
the ones who decrease their entries when playing the MG round, this sug-
gests that these males might display higher strategic sophistication in mixed
gender groups because they believe that females play better than males. In
one of the few studies looking at sex di¤erences in mentalizing, Krach et
al. (2009) use fMRI on subjects playing a Prisoners dilemma. The brain
activation patterns they observe are consistent with men compensating their
weaker mentalizing abilities by increased e¤ort. The change in the median
response across the two rounds for males who respond to Q2 that females
are better at the game is also consistent with this explanation. The median
is 28 in the MG round and 33 in the SG round. Unfortunately, our sam-
ple size does not allow for a more detailed analysis which can discriminate
further between these two hypotheses.
6 Robustness check: Accuracy
A key assumption in the analysis so far has been the association between
lower entries and higher strategic sophistication. However, this assumption
does not take into account that positive entries are a better response than
the Nash equilibrium strategy when opponents exhibit imperfect strategic
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sophistication. So as a robustness check, we use an alternative measure
of sophistication: The quadratic distance to the winning response. This
measure of (lack of) sophistication is similar to strategic IQ in Coricelli
and Nagel (2009). It accounts both for depth of reasoning and for the
correctness of beliefs about others responses. We compute the average
quadratic distance to the winning response (the inverse of accuracy) for the
eight rounds of the rst phase with  6= 1; and for each of the rounds of the
second phase in both treatments, Priming and No priming. The analysis
below shows that our main results hold when we use the quadratic distance
to the winning response as a measure of strategic sophistication.
There are substantial gender di¤erences in the distributions of the av-
erage distance to the winning responses in the rst phase (Mann-Whitney,
p < 0:001; Median test, p < 0:001). Figure 10 depicts the corresponding
kernel densities. Female players (atter curve) are clearly less accurate than
male players. This conrms our results in Section 4.1.1.
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Figure 10: Average quadratic distance to winning response in the rst phase by
gender.
In Figure 11 we extend the analysis to the classication by levels of
sophistication introduced in Section 4.1.1. The distributions of average
quadratic distances for low and high sophisticated individuals are statis-
tically di¤erent (Mann-Whitney, p < 0:001; Median test, p < 0:001). The
average quadratic distance to the winning response is signicantly higher
for individuals we classied as low sophisticated. Hence, there is a close
relationship between that classication and accuracy in the rst phase.
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Figure 11: Average quadratic distance to winning response in the rst phase by
level of sophistication.
Next we compare the accuracy of responses in the gender-balanced rounds
of the Priming and No priming treatments. Recall that Result 3 stated that
gender priming had the e¤ect of signicantly lowering the entries of female
participants and of increasing malesresponses. The strength of this e¤ect
was such that females displayed higher strategic sophistication than males
in the Priming treatment. These results remain, albeit less sharply, when
looking at accuracy. The upper panels of Figure 12 present the comparison
of accuracy across treatments, Priming (solid line) versus No priming (dot-
ted line), for males and females. The upper right panel shows that females
entries are indeed closer to the winning response in the Priming treatment
than under No priming (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:066; Median test, p = 0:044).
Priming does not change malesaccuracy though. Hence, we cannot con-
clude that gender priming makes males less accurate despite the fact that
their answers are higher in average when gender is made salient.
The lower panels of Figure 12 display the comparison across genders by
treatment. There are no gender di¤erences in accuracy in the No priming
treatment. The lower right panel shows that accuracy is higher for females
than for males in the Priming treatment (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:066; Median
test, p = 0:046).20 This corroborates our results in Section 4.1.3, namely
that gender priming makes females more sophisticated than males.
20A similar e¤ect is also observed in the same gender round of the Priming treatment
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:034; Median test, p = 0:067). Kernel densities for the quadratic
distance in this round can be found in Figure A3 in Appendix A.
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Figure 12: Quadratic distance to winning response by gender and treatment.
Finally, we do not nd any substantial e¤ect on accuracy due to changes
in the gender composition of the group. The distributions of quadratic
distances for both males and females do not di¤er across the SG and the
MG rounds of the Priming treatment (see Figure A4 in Appendix A).
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we explored the existence and endogeneity of gender dif-
ferences in observed strategic sophistication. Depth of strategic reasoning
might depend on individual cognitive abilities, beliefs about the sophistica-
tion of others and the size of incentives. Gender might be relevant to all
these three factors. We used the beauty contest game as experimental de-
sign. We chose this game because it is competitive, because incentives can
be easily manipulated and because beliefs about the sophistication of others
are important in it.
We reported results from two studies encompassing ten years of sessions
and over one thousand individuals. Study 1 was a large classroom experi-
ment. The main result of this study is that gender di¤erences in behavior
exist only when no monetary prize is awarded. We interpret this result in line
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with Croson and Gneezy (2009): Monetary incentives frame the interaction
as competitive. Females, being more sensitive to contextual information,
think more deeply about the game and gender di¤erences disappear. An
alternative, but not incompatible, explanation is that males derive utility
from winning regardless of whether a monetary prize is at stake.
Study 2 was a laboratory experiment where we manipulated gender prim-
ing and gender composition. Results of this study corroborate those in Study
1: Gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication disappear when incentives
are introduced. In addition, females react very strongly to gender priming
by increasing their level of sophistication. Males react to a lesser extent
and in the opposite direction. Gender di¤erences reappear when gender is
made salient but they are favourable to women. The e¤ect of changes in the
gender composition of the group was smaller and only applied to a subset of
males who display higher sophistication in mixed gender groups compared
to single gender groups.
To understand the forces driving these results, we explored the responses
to a questionnaire we administered to our participants. Responses to these
questionnaires show that females who react to gender priming are those who
believe that females are better in the game. We conclude that the combi-
nation of gender salience and the belief that women are better in the game
boosted the depth of reasoning of these participants. Males who answer
that females are better at the game display lower strategic sophistication
suggesting that these males might be experiencing stereotype threat.
Indirect evidence (e.g. Burnham et al., 2009) seemed to suggest that
no gender di¤erences existed in the beauty contest. We observe di¤erences
only when we manipulate incentives and gender priming. This might explain
why there are so few studies reporting gender di¤erences (or the lack of)
in strategic interactions. In incentivised experiments, gender di¤erences
might arise only if gender is made salient. Nevertheless, we are aware that
subjectscharacteristics could correlate with gender, e.g. major of study in
undergraduate populations, and thus create spurious gender di¤erences.21
Our subject pool in Study 2 was relatively homogeneous. Our participants
were students of Economics or Business, of very similar age and ethnic and
cultural background, so we are relatively free from this problem.
In sum, our results show that strategic sophistication, especially for fe-
males, is endogenous to incentives and gender priming. These results con-
rm previous ndings in the experimental literature highlighting the role of
beliefs about the strategic sophistication of other players (Agranov et al.,
21We thank Colin Camerer for pointing this out.
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2012; Georganas et al., 2015) and incentives (Alaoui and Penta, 2015) on
depth of strategic reasoning. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2016) nd that just
mentioning gender is enough to reduce womens performance in real-e¤ort
tasks perceived as male-biased. In contrast, when gender is made salient
in the guessing game, females increase their depth of reasoning and display
higher strategic sophistication than males. Our conjecture is that this pos-
itive e¤ect of gender priming is due to women perceiving themselves and
being perceived as superior in strategic settings. This is in line with studies
showing that womens performance is higher in tasks perceived to be female-
biased (e.g. Guenther et al., 2010). Results from a questionnaire adminis-
tered to a set of comparable non-participants with no previous knowledge
of the guessing game provide additional evidence of this stereotype.
The present paper is one of the few where women are observed to out-
perform men and where gender salience is benecial to female performance.
One exception is Shurchkov (2012), who obtains that women surpass men in
a low-pressure verbal task. Our result on gender priming is in even sharper
contrast with the literature on the e¤ect of gender information on perfor-
mance in mathematical tests. Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) nd that sim-
ply placing a woman in a room with men decreases her test performance.
Danaher and Crandall (2008) nd that just marking ones gender after an
advanced placement calculus test rather than before the test, led to a 33%
reduction in the performance gender-gap. Our results suggest that gender
salience in strategic interactions may lead to increases in depth of reasoning
in females, especially if condence on their own superiority is widespread
among women. Since gender priming seems to be detrimental for males,
selective gender salience might be even a more e¤ective intervention.
Our nal remark refers to the portability of our results. The beauty
contest is a relatively complex game with a big strategy space. Hence, it
is to be expected that players use simple rules of play, even non-strategic
ones (Fragiadakis et al., 2013). In fact, level-k theories can be interpreted as
rules of thumb grounded on "an instinctive reaction to the game" (Crawford
et al., 2013). These rules might change with how instructions are laid out
(Georganas et al., 2015) and with the strategy space (Benhabib et al., 2014).
It is natural to expect simple rules of play to be sensitive to individual
characteristics and gender salience. Further research should address whether
the gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication that we uncover in the
guessing game remain in other games where standard equilibrium predictions
are more transparent and where subjects may resort to simple rules of play
to a lesser extent.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure A1: Moves of participants in the SG-MG order of the Priming treatment.
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Figure A2: Cumulative distributions of responses by gender to phase 1 rounds.
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Figure A3: Quadratic distance to the winning response by gender in the SG
round.
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Figure A4: Quadratic distance to the winning response by gender across rounds of
the Priming treatment.
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No prize vs Prize
Males
No prize vs Prize
Females
Males vs Females
No prize
Males vs Females
Prize
1 -1.2772 3.1908*** -3.1385*** 1.7107*
6 -0.9446 2.3097** -2.3406*** 1.0942
10 -0.7632 1.8925* -1.9509* 0.2484
15 0.8216 2.3290*** -1.7346* 0.1031
22 0.4790 1.7681* -1.6279 -0.1163
33 1.4628 1.4961 -1.4248 -1.1050
44 0.7612 1.8036* -2.0286** -0.7584
50 0.1599 2.0818** -1.9510* 0.1594
67 1.0358 0.6773 -0.3669 -0.5475
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of the rst (second)
element in the comparison is higher than the other.
Table A1: Davidson-Duclos (DD) test t-statistics for Study 1.
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No incentives No priming MG Priming MG Priming SG
1 -0.3590 -0.5876 1.1679 0.8360
6 0.0000 1.1424 1.4564 1.1424
10 0.7027 -0.4862 1.5247 1.8045
15 0.2959 -1.4846 2.1139** 2.1552**
22 -0.3697 -1.2388 2.9304*** 2.7395***
33 -0.5036 1.1395 1.5524 1.1395
44 -2.4640*** -0.5485 1.4564 2.2548**
50 -1.1939 -1.4941 0.8203 2.5082***
67 -1.3783 -0.5876 0.0000 2.3180**
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of female
(male) responses is higher than for the other sex.
Table A2: Female-male DD test t-statistics per round of Study 2.
42
No priming vs Priming
Males
No priming vs Priming
Females
MG vs SG
Males
MG vs SG
Females
1 0.3997 -1.3367 0.0000 0.3444
6 0.4696 -0.5091 -0.5308 -0.2135
10 2.0239** -1.3829 0.6414 0.3619
15 1.8956* -1.4839 0.3783 0.3367
22 1.2168 -2.4439*** 0.1686 0.3502
33 1.2168 -2.1491** 0.0000 0.4106
44 0.5091 -1.3620 0.2135 -0.6037
50 1.7186* -0.7210 0.7095 -1.0366
67 0.2455 -0.3997 1.1679 -1.4342
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of the rst
(second) element in the comparison is higher than the other.
Table A3: DD test t-statistics for round comparisons in Study 2.
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Appendix B: Instructions of Study 2 (translated from
Spanish)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Hello. Many thanks for taking part in this session.
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in
strategic settings.
The session is organized in two parts:
In the rst part, you should answer a series of independent questions with
the objective of becoming familiar with the rules of the experiment.
In the second part, you should answer another series of independent
questions. You will compete with the rest of participants in your room for
a monetary prize. The participant with the most correct answer will be the
winner.
After reading these instructions you will nd the rst set of questions. We
will read each question aloud. You will have time to answer each question
before moving to the next one.
Read carefully each question and take the time you need to answer it.
It is very important that you remain silent during the whole session.
Otherwise, the data collected will be useless.
Please do not go to the next question until we tell you to.
Before starting the experiment please write in the box below your
participant number.
GENERIC ROUND QUESTION (PHASE 1)
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Each one of you should choose a number between 0 and 100 with the
objective of guessing (p fraction of) the average of the numbers chosen by
all the participants in this room.
The winner will be the participant(s) whose answer is the closest to the (p
fraction of the) average of all numbers chosen.
Which number do you choose?
Do not go to the next question until being instructed to do so.
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INSTRUCTIONS PHASE 2
Now the second phase of the experiment begins.
In this phase, you will participate in tow independent rounds. The
structure and rules are similar to those of phase 1 but there are two main
di¤erences:
1. The identity of the participants you will compete with will change in
each round.
2. There will be two monetary prizes of 40 euros each.
At the end of the second phase, one of the two rounds will be chosen
randomly. The winner of this round will obtain the prize. If there is more
than one winner in the chosen round, the prize will be split among the
winners.
Again questions will be read aloud.
Read carefully each question and take the time you need to answer it.
Recall that it is very important that you remain silent during the whole
session. Otherwise, the data collected will be useless.
Please do not go to the next question until we tell you to.
Before continuing please write in the box below your participant number.
GENERIC ROUND QUESTION (PHASE 2)
Each one of you should choose a number between 0 and 100 with the
objective of guessing the "2/3 of the average" of the numbers chosen in
this question by all the participants in this room.
The winner will be the participant(s) whose answer is the closest to the
2/3 of the average of all numbers chosen in this question by all the
participants in this room.
Which number do you choose?
Now close the booklet and remain silent.
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